Psychology aims to give us a scientific account of how the mind works. But what does it mean to have a science of the mental, and what sort of picture of the mind emerges from our best psychological theories? This book addresses these philosophical puzzles in a way that is accessible to readers with little or no background in psychology or neuroscience. Using clear and detailed case studies and drawing on up-to-date empirical research, it examines perception and action, the link between attention and consciousness, the modularity of mind, how we understand other minds, and the influence of language on thought, as well as the relationships among mind, brain, body, and world. The result is an integrated and comprehensive overview of much of the architecture of the mind, which will be valuable for both students and specialists in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. daniel a. weiskopf is an associate professor of philosophy and an associate faculty member in the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University. He has published numerous articles and chapters on concepts and mental representation, the structure of higher cognition, embodied and extended cognition, mechanistic and functional explanation, and modeling practices in the mind/brain sciences.
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Preface
Our topic here is psychology, the self-styled science of the mind. Psychology's aim is to explain mental phenomena by describing the underlying processes, systems, and mechanisms that give rise to them. These hidden causal levers underlie all of our mental feats, including our richest conscious perceptions, our most subtle chains of reasoning, and our widest-ranging plans and actions. Although the phenomena of mind are intimately related to events occurring in the brain, these psychological explanations are, we will argue, distinct and autonomous relative to explanations in terms of neural processes and mechanisms. According to the view we present here, psychology and neuroscience are different enterprises. We certainly wouldn't claim that our ever-increasing understanding of how the brain works has nothing to say to psychology: on the contrary, they are complementary, because neuroscience can provide invaluable input to psychological theorizing (and vice versa, a point that we think is not stressed often enough). But our task will be to give a thorough account of the scope, methods, content, and prospects for a distinctive science of our mental lives. This book is intended for students in philosophy, psychology, and the more cognitively oriented branches of neuroscience, as well as for readers who are merely curious about what these fields might have to contribute to our understanding of the mind. However, we hope that our professional colleagues will also find much to engage with here. So we've done our best to produce a book that holds interest on all levels -for undergraduates, graduates, and researchers alike. We have tried not to presuppose any significant background in any of the sciences that we discuss, and we hope that this book will serve as a useful companion for many of those pursuing the interdisciplinary study of cognition.
Part of our motivation in writing this book was to show philosophy of psychology to be, first and foremost, a branch of philosophy of science, not Readers hoping for discussions of the merits of the computational theory of mind or naturalized semantics, for example, will not find them prominently mentioned here. We hope that this omission is understandable, given that they have been widely discussed (nearly to exhaustion) elsewhere.
However, that does not mean that metaphysical issues as such have been given short shrift. Rather, where they arise, we have tried to emphasize the consequences that they have for how we design studies and think about the broader implications of theories of cognition. Metaphysical questions about the mind, as they appear here, are always grounded in their relation to scientific practices.
In keeping with this theme, the structure of the book attempts to reflect as much as possible the topics that are actively debated among psychologists, as well as the standard research methods and explanatory strategies they employ. The experiments and theories we discuss, and the styles of argument that we use, should accordingly be ones that are quite familiar to those who know the psychological literature. One of our goals in sticking closely to the science is to give philosophers some sense for how arguments among various theoretical positions are actually decided in psychology. We especially hope to convey just how densely packed with details these arguments can be, and how many different empirical and theoretical commitments they must balance.
Indeed, there is much more detail than any single volume could possibly contain, so we have provided extensive references to guide those interested in exploring the literature further.
That is not to say, however, that we have aimed to produce merely a neutral summary of the results. Far from it -we have organized and presented these materials in order to draw substantive conclusions. So this book is intended not only to introduce these debates in some depth but also to stake out positions on the issues, where the evidence seems to warrant it. Where we are My sincere thanks to Fred for pitching this project to me, and for the comically accurate account of our meeting above. I'd also like to enthusiastically
